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Abstract
The credit crisis and the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis have highlighted the
native form of credit risk, namely the counterparty risk. The related Credit Valuation
Adjustment (CVA), Debt Valuation Adjustment (DVA), Liquidity Valuation Adjust-
ment (LVA) and Replacement Cost (RC) issues, jointly referred to in this paper as
Total Valuation Adjustment (TVA), have been thoroughly investigated in the theoreti-
cal papers [Cr12a] and [Cr12b]. The present work provides an executive summary and
numerical companion to these papers, through which the TVA pricing problem can be
reduced to Markovian pre-default TVA BSDEs. The first step consists in the counter-
party clean valuation of a portfolio of contracts, which is the valuation in a hypothetical
situation where the two parties would be risk-free and funded at a risk-free rate. In
the second step, the TVA is obtained as the value of an option on the counterparty
clean value process called Contingent Credit Default Swap (CCDS). Numerical results
are presented for interest rate swaps in the Vasicek, as well as in the inverse Gaussian
Hull-White short rate model, also allowing one to assess the related model risk issue.
Keywords: Counterparty risk, Credit valuation adjustment (CVA), Debt valuation ad-
justment (DVA), Liquidity valuation adjustment (LVA), Replacement cost (RC), Backward
stochastic differential equation (BSDE), Le´vy process, Interest rate swap.
1 Introduction
The credit crisis and the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis have highlighted the native
form of credit risk, namely the counterparty risk. This is the risk of non-payment of promised
cash-flows due to the default of the counterparty in a bilateral OTC derivative transaction.
The basic counterparty risk mitigation tool is a Credit Support Annex (CSA) specifying a
valuation scheme of a portfolio of contracts at the default time of a party. In particular, the
∗The research of S. Cre´pey and Z. Grbac benefited from the support of the ‘Chaire Risque de cre´dit’,
Fe´de´ration Bancaire Franc¸aise. R. Gerboud and N. Ngor are former students from the MSc quantitative
finance program M2IF at Evry University. The authors warmly thank Anthony Dorme and Remi Takase,
two other former M2IF students, for their help in the numerical studies of the Le´vy model and of the TVA
BSDEs.
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2netting rules which will be applied to the portfolio are specified, as well as a collateralization
scheme similar to margin accounts in futures contracts.
By extension counterparty risk is also the volatility of the price of this risk, this price
being known as Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA), see [PR05], [BMP13], [BBCH13].
Moreover, as banks themselves have become risky, counterparty risk must be understood in
a bilateral perspective, where the counterparty risk of the two parties are jointly accounted
for in the modeling. Thus, in addition to the CVA, a Debt Valuation Adjustment (DVA)
must be considered. In this context the classical assumption of a locally risk-free asset
which is used for financing purposes of the bank is not sustainable anymore. This raises
the companion issue of proper nonlinear accounting of the funding costs of a position, and
a corresponding Liquidity Valuation Adjustment (LVA). The last related issue is that of
Replacement Cost (RC) corresponding to the fact that at the default time of a party the
contract is valued by the liquidator according to a CSA valuation scheme which can fail to
reflect the actual value of the contract at that time.
The CVA/DVA/LVA/RC intricacy issues, jointly referred to henceforth as TVA (for
Total Valuation Adjustment), were thoroughly investigated in the theoretical papers [Cr12a],
[Cr12b], [BCPP11] and [BK11]. The present work is a numerical companion paper to
[Cr12a] and [Cr12b]. Section 2 provides an executive summary of the two papers. Section 3
describes various CSA specifications. In Sections 4 and 5 we present clean valuation (clean
of counterparty risk and funding costs) and TVA computations in two simple models for
interest rate derivatives. We show in a series of practical examples how CVA, DVA, LVA
and RC can be computed in various situations, and we also assess the related model risk
issue.
2 TVA Representations
2.1 Setup
We consider a netted portfolio of OTC derivatives between two defaultable counterparties,
generically referred to as the “contract between the bank and her counterparty”. The
counterparty is most commonly a bank as well. Counterparty risk and funding cash-flows
can only be considered at a netted and global level, outside the scope of different business
desks. Consequently, the price Π of the contract must be computed as a difference between
the clean price P provided by the relevant business desk and a correction Θ computed
by the central TVA desk. By price we mean here the cost for the bank of margining,
hedging and funding (“cost of hedging” for short). By clean price we mean the price of
the contract computed without taking into account counterparty risk and excess funding
costs. Symmetrical considerations apply to the counterparty, but with non-symmetrical
data in the sense of hedging positions and funding conditions. As a consequence and due
to nonlinearities in the funding costs, the prices (costs of hedging) are not the same for the
two parties. For clarity we focus on the bank’s price in the sequel.
We denote by T the time horizon of the contract with promised dividends dDt from
the bank to her counterparty. Both parties are defaultable, with respective default times
denoted by θ and θ. This results in an effective dividend stream dCt = JtdDt, where
Jt = 1t<τ with τ = θ ∧ θ. One denotes by τ¯ = τ ∧ T the effective time horizon of
the contract as there are no cash-flows after τ¯ . The case of unilateral counterparty risk
(from the perspective of the bank) can be recovered by letting θ ≡ ∞. After having sold
the contract to the investor at time 0, the bank sets-up a collateralization, hedging and
3funding portfolio (“hedging portfolio” for short). We call an external funder of the bank
(or funder for short) a generic third-party, possibly composed in practice of several entities
or devices, insuring funding of the position of the bank. This funder, assumed default-free
for simplicity, thus plays the role of “lender/borrower of last resort” after exhaustion of the
internal sources of funding provided to the bank via the dividend and funding gains on her
hedge, or via the remuneration of the margin amount.
The full model filtration is given as G = F ∨Hθ ∨Hθ, where F is a reference filtration
and Hθt = σ(θ ∧ t), Hθt = σ(θ ∧ t). A probability space (Ω,GT ,P), where P is some risk-
neutral pricing measure, is fixed throughout. The meaning of a risk-neutral pricing measure
in this context, with different funding rates in particular (see [Cr12a]), will be specified by
martingale conditions introduced below in the form of suitable pricing backward stochastic
differential equations (BSDEs); see [EPQ97] for the seminal reference in finance.
Remark 2.1 Even though it will not appear explicitly in this paper, a pricing measure
must also be such that the gain processes on the hedging assets follow martingales, see
[Cr12a].
Moreover, we assume that F is immersed into G in the sense that an F-martingale stopped
at τ is a G-martingale.
Remark 2.2 As discussed in [Cr12b], this basic assumption precludes major wrong-way
risk effects such as the ones which occur with counterparty risk on credit derivatives. In
particular, under these assumptions an F-adapted ca`dla`g process cannot jump at τ. We
refer to [Cr12c] for an extension of the general methodology of this paper beyond the above
immersion setup to incorporate wrong-way risk when necessary.
2.2 Data
We denote by rt an OIS rate, where OIS stands for an Overnight Indexed Swap, the best
market proxy of a risk-free rate. By r˜t = rt + γt we denote the credit-risk adjusted rate,
where γt is the F-hazard intensity of τ , which is assumed to exist. Let βt = exp(−
∫ t
0 rsds)
and β˜t = exp(−
∫ t
0 r˜sds) stand for the corresponding discount factors. Furthermore, IEt and
E˜t stand for the conditional expectations given Gt and Ft, respectively. The clean value
process Pt of the contract with promised dividends dDt is defined as, for t ∈ [0, τ¯ ],
βtPt := E˜t
(∫ T
t
βsdDs
)
= IEt
[ ∫ τ¯
t
βsdDs + βτ¯Pτ¯
]
(1)
by immersion of F into G.
Effectively, promised dividends dDt stop being paid at τ (if τ < T ), at which time
the last terminal cash-flow R paid by the bank closes out her position. Let an F-adapted
process Q represent the (predictable) CSA value process of the contract, and an F-adapted
process Γ stand for the value process of a CSA (cash) collateralization scheme. We denote
by pi a real number meant to represent the wealth of the hedging portfolio of the bank in the
financial interpretation. The close-out cash-flow R = R(pi) is in fact twofold, decomposing
into a close-out cash-flow Ri from the bank to the counterparty, minus, in case of default of
the bank, a cash-flow Rf = Rf (pi) from the funder to the bank (depending on pi). These two
cash-flows are respectively derived from the algebraic debt χ of the bank to her counterparty
and X(pi) of the bank to her funder, modeled at time τ as
χ = Qτ − Γτ , X(pi) = −(pi − Γτ−). (2)
4The close-out cash-flow, if τ < T , is then modeled as R(pi) = Ri − 1τ=θRf (pi), where
Ri = Γτ + 1τ=θ
(
ρχ+ − χ−)− 1τ=θ(ρχ− − χ+)− 1θ=θχ
Rf (pi) = (1− r)X+(pi), (3)
in which ρ and ρ stand for recovery rates between the two parties, and r stands for a recovery
rate of the bank to her funder. The Gτ -measurable exposure at default is defined in terms
of R as
ξ(pi) := Pτ −R(pi) = Pτ −Qτ + 1τ=θ
(
(1− ρ)χ+ + (1− r)X+(pi))− (1− ρ)1τ=θχ−, (4)
where the second equality follows by an easy algebraic manipulation.
We now consider the cash-flows required for funding the bank’s position, meant in the
sense of the contract and its hedging portfolio altogether. For simplicity we stick to the
most common situation where the hedge is self-funded as swapped and/or traded via repo
markets (see [Cr12a]). The OIS rate rt is used as a reference for all other funding rates,
which are thus defined in terms of corresponding bases to rt. Given such bases bt and b¯t
related to the collateral posted and received by the bank, and λt and λ¯t related to external
lending and borrowing, the funding coefficient gt(pi) is defined by
gt(pi) = (btΓ
+
t − b¯tΓ−t ) + λt (pi − Γt)+ − λ¯t (pi − Γt)− . (5)
Then (rtpi + gt(pi))dt represents the bank’s funding cost over (t, t + dt), depending on its
wealth pi.
Remark 2.3 A funding basis is typically interpreted as a combination of liquidity and/or
credit risk, see [FT11a] and [CD12]. Collateral posted in foreign-currency and switching
currency collateral optionalities can also be accounted for by suitable amendments to b and
b¯, see [FST10] and [Pit12].
2.3 BSDEs
With the data ξ and g specified, the TVA process Θ can be implicitly defined on [0, τ¯ ] as the
solution to the following BSDE, posed in integral form and over the random time interval
[0, τ¯ ]: For t ∈ [0, τ¯ ],
βtΘt = IEt
[
βτ¯1τ<T ξ(Pτ −Θτ−) +
∫ τ¯
t
βsgs(Ps −Θs)ds
]
. (6)
The reader is referred to [Cr12b, Proposition 2.1] for the derivation of the TVA BSDE (6).
In this paper for simplicity of presentation we take (6) as the definition of the TVA.
The practical conclusion of [Cr12b] is that one can even adopt a simpler “reduced, pre-
default” perspective in which defaultability of the two parties only shows up through their
default intensities, see Proposition 2.4 below and equation (3.8) in [Cr12b]. For t ∈ [0, T ]
and pi ∈ R let
χt = Qt − Γt
ξ˜t(pi) = (Pt −Qt) + pt
(
(1− ρt)χ+t + (1− r)(pi − Γt)−(pi)
)− pt(1− ρt)χ−t , (7)
in which
pτ = P(τ = θ | Gτ−) , pτ = P(τ = θ | Gτ−).
Note that in case of unilateral counterparty risk, we have θ =∞ and consequently, pτ = 0,
pτ = 1.
5Proposition 2.4 (TVA Reduced-Form Representation) One has Θ = Θ˜ on [0, τ¯)
and Θτ¯ = 1τ<T ξ, where
β˜tΘ˜t = E˜t
[ ∫ T
t
β˜s
(
gs(Ps − Θ˜s) + γsξ˜s(Ps − Θ˜s)
)
ds
]
, (8)
for t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 2.5 This assumes that the data of (8) are in F, a mild condition which can always
be met be passing to F-representatives (or pre-default values) of the original data.
Remark 2.6 For r = 1 the exposure at default ξ does not depend on pi, and in case of a
linear funding coefficient given as gt(P − ϑ) = g0t (P ) − λ0tϑ, for some g0 and λ0, the TVA
equations (6) and (8) respectively boil down to the explicit representations
β0t Θt = IEt
[
β0τ¯1τ<T ξ +
∫ τ¯
t β
0
sg
0
s(Ps)ds
]
(9)
β˜0t Θ˜t = I˜Et
[ ∫ T
t β˜
0
s
(
g0s(P
0
s ) + γsξ˜
0
s
)
ds
]
. (10)
Here the funding-adjusted discount factors are
β0t = exp(−
∫ t
0
(rs + λ
0
s)ds) , β˜
0
t = exp(−
∫ t
0
(r˜s + λ
0
s)ds)
and ξ˜0t in (10) is given by
ξ˜0t = (Pt −Qt) + pt(1− ρt)χ+t − pt(1− ρt)χ−t .
On the numerical side such explicit representations allow one to estimate the corresponding
“linear TVAs” by standard Monte Carlo loops provided that Pt and Qt can be computed
explicitly. In general (for example as soon as r < 1), nonlinear TVA computations can
only be done by more advanced schemes involving linearization [FT11b], nonlinear regres-
sion [CAC+10] or branching particles [HL12]. Deterministic schemes for the corresponding
semilinear TVA PDEs can only be used in low dimension.
In differential form the pre-default TVA BSDE (8) reads as follows (cf. [Cr12b, Defi-
nition 3.1]) {
Θ˜T = 0, and for t ∈ [0, T ] :
− dΘ˜t = g˜t(Pt − Θ˜t)dt− dµ˜t,
(11)
where µ˜ is the F-martingale component of Θ˜ and
g˜t(Pt − ϑ) = gt(Pt − ϑ) + γtξ˜t(Pt − ϑ)− r˜tϑ. (12)
Remark 2.7 From (1), P satisfies the following F-BSDE{
PT = 0, and for t ∈ [0, T ] :
− dPt = dDt − rtPtdt− dMt,
(13)
6for some F-martingale M . Therefore, the following pre-default F-BSDE in Π˜ := P − Θ˜
follows from (11) and (13): Π˜T = 0, and for t ∈ [0, T ] :− dΠ˜t = dDt − (g˜t(Π˜t) + rtPt) dt− dν˜t, (14)
where dν˜t = dMt−dµ˜t.As the pre-default price BSDE (14) involves the contractual promised
cash-flows dDt, it is less user-friendly than the pre-default TVA BSDE (11). This math-
ematical incentive comes on top of the financial justification recalled at the beginning of
Section 2 for adopting a two-stage “clean price P minus TVA correction Θ” approach to
the counterparty risk and funding issues.
2.3.1 Pre-default Markov Setup
Assume
g˜t(Pt − ϑ) = ĝ(t,Xt, θ) (15)
for some deterministic function ĝ(t, x, θ), and an Rd-valued F-Markov pre-default factor
process X. Then Θ˜t = Θ˜(t,Xt), where the pre-default TVA pricing function Θ˜(t, x) is the
solution to the following pre-default pricing PDE:{
Θ˜(T, x) = 0 , x ∈ Rd
(∂t + X ) Θ˜(t, x) + ĝ(t, x, Θ˜(t, x)) = 0 on [0, T )× Rd,
(16)
in which X stands for the infinitesimal generator of X. As mentioned in Remark 2.6, from
the point of view of numerical solution, deterministic PDE schemes for (16) can be used
provided the dimension of X is less than 3 or 4, otherwise simulation schemes for (11) are
the only viable alternative.
2.4 CVA, DVA, LVA and RC
Plugging (7) into (12) and reordering terms yields
g˜t(Pt − ϑ) + rtϑ =− γtpt(1− ρ)(Qt − Γt)−
+ γtpt
(
(1− ρ)(Qt − Γt)+
+ btΓ
+
t − b¯tΓ−t + λt(Pt − ϑ− Γt)+ − λ˜t(Pt − ϑ− Γt)−
+ γt (Pt − ϑ−Qt) ,
(17)
where the coefficient λ˜t := λ¯t − γtpt(1 − r) of (Pt − ϑ− Γt)− in the third line can be
interpreted as an external borrowing basis net of credit spread. This coefficient represents
the liquidity component of λ¯. From the perspective of the bank, the four terms in this
decomposition of the TVA Θ can respectively be interpreted as a costly (non-algebraic,
strict) credit value adjustment (CVA), a beneficial debt value adjustment (DVA), a liquidity
funding benefit/cost (LVA), and a replacement benefit/cost (RC). In particular, the time-0
7TVA can be represented as
Θ0 =− IE
[ ∫ T
0
βtγt(1− ρ)pt(Qt − Γt)−dt
]
+ IE
[ ∫ T
0
βtγt(1− ρ)pt(Qt − Γt)+dt
]
+ IE
[ ∫ T
0
βt
(
btΓ
+
t − b¯tΓ−t + λt(Pt − Θ˜t − Γt)+ − λ˜t(Pt − Θ˜t − Γt)−
)
dt
]
+ IE
[ ∫ T
0
βtγt(Pt − Θ˜t −Qt)dt
]
.
(18)
The DVA and the γtpt(1 − r)(Pt − Θ˜t − Γt)−-component of the LVA can be considered as
“deal facilitating” as they increase the TVA and therefore decrease the price (cost of the
hedge) the bank can consider selling the contract to her counterparty. Conversely, the CVA
and the λ¯t(Pt − Θ˜t − Γt)− components of the LVA (for λ¯t positive) can be considered as
“deal hindering” as they decrease the TVA and therefore increase the price (cost of the
hedge) for the bank. The remaining terms can be interpreted likewise as “deal facilitating
or hindering” depending on their sign, which is unspecified in general.
3 CSA Specifications
In the next subsections we detail various specifications of the general form (17) of g˜, de-
pending on the CSA data: the close-out valuation scheme Q, the collateralization scheme
Γ and the collateral remuneration bases b and b¯.
3.1 Clean CSA Recovery Scheme
In case of a clean CSA recovery scheme Q = P , (17) rewrites as follows:
g˜t(Pt − ϑ) + r˜tϑ =− γtpt(1− ρ)(Pt − Γt)−
+ γtpt
(
(1− ρ)(Pt − Γt)+
+ btΓ
+
t − b¯tΓ−t + λt(Pt − ϑ− Γt)+ − λ˜t(Pt − ϑ− Γt)−.
(19)
Note r˜t on the left-hand side as opposed to rt in (17). In case of no collateralization, i.e.
for Γ = 0, the right-hand-side of (19) reduces to
−γtpt(1− ρ)P−t + γtpt(1− ρ)P+t + λt (Pt − ϑ)+ − λ˜t (Pt − ϑ)− ; (20)
whereas in case of continuous collateralization with Γ = Q = P , it boils down to
−b¯tP−t + btP+t + λtϑ− − λ˜tϑ+. (21)
Remark 3.1 If λ = λ˜ (case of equal external borrowing and lending liquidity bases), the
TVA is linear for every collateralization scheme of the form Pt−Γt = εt, for some exogenous1
residual exposure εt, cf. Remark 2.6. Setting
g˜λt = − (γtpt(1− ρ) + λt) ε−t + (γtpt(1− ρ) + λt) ε+t + btΓ+t − b¯tΓ−t , (22)
1Not depending on Θ˜t, like with null or continuous collateralization.
8one ends up, similarly to (10), with
β˜λt Θ˜t = I˜Et
∫ T
t β˜
λ
s g˜
λ
s ds (23)
for the funding-adjusted discount factor
β˜λt = exp(−
∫ t
0
(r˜s + λs)ds). (24)
3.2 Pre-Default CSA Recovery Scheme
In case of a pre-default CSA recovery scheme Q = Π˜ = P − Θ˜, (17) rewrites as follows
g˜t(ϑ) + rtϑ =−
(
γtpt(1− ρ) + λ˜t
)
(Pt − ϑ− Γt)−
+ (γtpt(1− ρ) + λt) (Pt − ϑ− Γt)+
+ btΓ
+
t − b¯tΓ−t .
(25)
In case of no collateralization, i.e. for Γ = 0, the right-hand-side reduces to
− (γtpt(1− ρ) + λ˜t) (Pt − ϑ)− + (γtpt(1− ρ) + λt)(Pt − ϑ)+; (26)
whereas the continuous collateralization with Γ = Q = P − Θ˜ yields
bt(Pt − ϑ)+ − b¯t(Pt − ϑ)−. (27)
Remark 3.2 If b = b¯ (case of equal collateral borrowing and lending liquidity bases), the
TVA is linear for every collateralization scheme of the form Pt − Θ˜t − Γt = εt, for some
exogenous2 residual exposure εt, cf. Remark 2.6. Setting
g˜bt =−
(
γtpt(1− ρ) + λ˜t
)
ε−t + bt (Pt − εt) + (γtpt(1− ρ) + λt) ε+t , (28)
one ends up, again similarly to (10), with
β˜bt Θ˜t = I˜Et
[ ∫ T
t β˜
b
sg˜
b
sds
]
(29)
for the funding-adjusted discount factor
β˜bt = exp(−
∫ t
0
(rs + bs)ds). (30)
Remark 3.3 If b = b¯ = 0, the two continuous collateralization schemes of equations (21))
and (27) equally collapse to Θ˜ = 0 and Π˜ = P = Γ = Q.
2Not depending on Θ˜t, like with continuous collateralization.
93.3 Full Collateralization CSA
Let us define the full collateralization CSA by Q = Γ∗ where Γ∗ is given as the solution to
the following F-BSDE:{
Γ∗T = PT , and for t ∈ [0, T ] :
dΓ∗t −
(
(rt + bt)(Γ
∗
t )
+ − (rt + b¯t)(Γ∗t )−
)
dt = dPt − rtPtdt+ dµ˜∗t
(31)
for some F-martingale µ˜∗. Then Θ˜ := P − Γ∗ solves the pre-default TVA BSDE (11), or in
other words Π˜ = Γ∗. Indeed one has by (17), that for t ∈ [0, T ]
g˜t(Γ
∗
t ) + rt(Pt − Γ∗t ) = bt(Γ∗t )+ − b¯t(Γ∗t )−,
hence
(rt + bt)(Γ
∗
t )
+ − (rt + b¯t)(Γ∗t )− − rtPt = g˜t(Γ∗t ).
Therefore, the second line of (31) reads as
−(dPt − dΓ∗t ) = g˜t(Γ∗t )dt− dµ˜∗t = g˜t(Pt − (Pt − Γ∗t ))dt− dµ˜∗t ,
which, together with the fact that P − Γ∗ vanishes at T , means that P − Γ∗ satisfies the
pre-default TVA BSDE (11).
If b = b¯, then g˜t(Π˜t) + rtPt reduces to (rt + bt)Π˜t in the BSDE (14) for the fully
collateralized price Π˜ = Γ∗. This BSDE is thus equivalent to the following explicit expression
for Π˜:
β˜bt Π˜t = I˜Et
[ ∫ T
t β˜
b
sdDs
]
, (32)
where the funding-adjusted discount factor β˜b is defined by (30). In the special case b =
b¯ = 0, we have Γ∗ = P which is the situation already considered in Remark 3.3. This case,
which yields Θ˜ = 0 and Π˜ = P = Q = Γ, justifies the status of formula (1) as the master
clean valuation formula of a fully collateralized price at an OIS collateral funding rate rt.
With such a fully collateralized CSA there is no need for pricing-and-hedging a (null) TVA.
The problem boils down to the computation of a clean price P and a related hedge, see e.g.
[Cr12b] for possible clean hedge specifications.
3.4 Pure Funding
In case γ = 0, which is a no counterparty risk, pure funding issue case, the CSA value
process Q plays no actual role. In particular the dt-coefficient of the BSDE (14) for Π˜ is
given by
g˜t(Π˜t) + rtPt = (rt + bt)Γ
+
t − (rt + b¯t)Γ−t + (rt + λt)(Π˜− Γt)+ − (rt + λ˜t)(Π˜− Γt)−,
where λ˜ = λ¯ is a pure liquidity external borrowing basis. In case Γ = 0 and λ = λ˜ this
results in the following explicit expression of Π˜:
β˜λt Π˜t = I˜Et
∫ T
t β˜
λ
s dDs, (33)
with the funding-adjusted discount factor β˜λ defined in (24). In the special case λ˜ = λ¯ = 0
one recovers the classical valuation formula (1) for Π˜ = P .
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3.5 Asymmetrical TVA Approach
In practice the bank can hardly hedge her jump-to-default and therefore cannot monetize
and benefit from her default unless and before it actually happens). If one wants to ac-
knowledge this, one can avoid to reckon any actual benefit of the bank from her own default
by letting ρ = r = 1, cf. (4). Such an asymmetrical TVA approach, even though still
bilateral, allows one to avoid many concerns of a general symmetrical TVA approach, such
as the arbitrage issue that arises for r < 1, the hypothetical and paradoxical benefit of the
bank at her own default time, and the puzzle for the bank of having to hedge her own
jump-to-default risk in order to monetize this benefit before her default (see [Cr12a] and
[Cr12b])). Indeed in this case equation (17) reduces to
g˜t(Pt − ϑ) + rtϑ =− γtpt(1− ρ)(Qt − Γt)−
+ btΓ
+
t − b¯tΓ−t + λt (Pt − ϑ− Γt)+ − λ¯t (Pt − ϑ− Γt)−
+ γt (Pt − ϑ−Qt) ,
(34)
where there is no beneficial debt valuation adjustment anymore (for ρ = 1 the second line of
(17) vanishes), and where the borrowing funding basis λ¯t is interpreted as a pure liquidity
cost.
Note that in case of a pre-default CSA recovery scheme Q = Π˜− = P − Θ˜−, an
asymmetrical (but still bilateral) TVA approach is equivalent to a unilateral TVA approach
where the bank would simply disregard her own credit risk. One has in both cases
g˜t(Pt − ϑ) + rtϑ = btΓ+t − b¯tΓ−t + λt (Pt − ϑ− Γt)+ −
(
λ¯t + γtpt(1− ρ)
)
(Pt − ϑ− Γt)− ,
where γp is the intensity of default of the counterparty. Moreover, in an asymmetrical TVA
approach with Q = Π˜−, an inspection of the related equations in [Cr12b] shows that a
perfect TVA hedge by the bank of an isolated default of her counterparty (obtained as the
solution to the last equation in [Cr12b]) in fact yields a perfect hedge of the TVA jump-to-
default risk altogether (default of the counterparty and/or the bank). This holds at least
provided that the hedging instrument which is used for that purpose (typically a clean CDS
on the counterparty) does not jump in value at an isolated default time of the bank, a mild
condition3 satisfied in most models.
4 Clean Valuations
In the numerical Section 5, we shall resort to two univariate short rate models, presented
in Subsections 4.2 and 4.3, for TVA computations on an interest rate swap. These are
Markovian pre-default TVA models in the sense of Subsection 2.3.1, with factor process
Xt = rt. Our motivation for considering two different models is twofold. Firstly, we want to
emphasize the fact that from an implementation point of view, the BSDE schemes that we
use for TVA computations are quite model-independent (at least the backward nonlinear
regression stage, after a forward simulation of the model in a first stage). Secondly, this
allows one to assess the TVA model risk.
Remark 4.1 The choice of interest rate derivatives for the illustrative purpose of this
paper is not innocuous. The basic credit risk reduced-form methodology of this paper is
3In the notation of the concluding Subsection 4.4 of [Cr12b], this is given by “R1t = P˜1t on θ < θ ∧ T .”
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suitable for situations of reasonable dependence between the reference contract and the two
parties (reasonable or unknown, e.g. the dependence between interest rates and credit is
not liquidly priced on the market, see [BP08]). For cases of strong dependence such as
counterparty risk on credit derivatives, the additional tools of [Cr12c] are necessary.
Talking about interest rate derivatives, one should also mention the systemic counter-
party risk, referring to various significant spreads which emerged since August 2007 between
quantities that were very similar before, like OIS swap rates and LIBOR swap rates of differ-
ent tenors. Through its discounting implications, this systemic component of counterparty
risk has impacted all derivative markets. This means that in the current market conditions,
one should actually use multiple-curve clean value models of interest rate derivatives in the
TVA computations (see for instance [CGN12] and the references therein). In order not to
blur the main flow of argument we postpone this to a follow-up work.
4.1 Products
In the sequel we shall deal with the following interest rate derivatives: forward rate agree-
ments (FRAs), IR swaps and caps, whose definitions we provide below. The latter are used
in Section 5 for calibration purposes. The underlying rate for all these derivatives is the
LIBOR rate. We work under the usual convention that the LIBOR rate is set in advance
and the payments are made in arrears. As pointed out in Remark 4.1, we do not tackle
here the multiple-curve issue. Thus, we use the classical definition of the forward LIBOR
rate Lt(T, T + δ), fixed at time t ≤ T , for the future time interval [T, T + δ]:
Lt(T, T + δ) =
1
δ
(
Bt(T )
Bt(T + δ)
− 1
)
,
where B·(T ) denotes the time-t price of a zero coupon bond with maturity T .
Definition 4.2 A forward rate agreement (FRA) is a financial contract which fixes the
interest rate K which will be applied to a future time interval. Denote by T > 0 the future
inception date, by T + δ the maturity of the contract, where δ ≥ 0, and by N the notional
amount. The payoff of the FRA at maturity T + δ is equal to
P fra(T + δ;T, T + δ,K,N) = Nδ(LT (T, T + δ)−K).
The value at time t ∈ [0, T ] of the FRA is given by
P fra(t;T, T + δ,K,N) = N(Bt(T )− K¯Bt(T + δ)), (35)
where K¯ = 1 + δK.
Definition 4.3 An interest rate (IR) swap is a financial contract between two parties to
exchange one stream of future interest payments for another, based on a specified notional
amount N . A fixed-for-floating swap is a swap in which fixed payments are exchanged
for floating payments linked to the LIBOR rate. Denote by T0 ≥ 0 the inception date,
by T1 < · · · < Tn, where T1 > T0, a collection of the payment dates and by K the fixed
rate. Under our sign convention recalled in Section 2 that the clean price values promised
dividends dDt from the bank to her counterparty, the time-t clean price of the swap Pt for
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the bank when it pays the floating rate (case of the so-called receiver swap for the bank) is
given by
Pt = P
sw(t;T1, Tn) = N
(
Bt(T0)−Bt(Tn)−K
n∑
k=1
δk−1Bt(Tk)
)
, (36)
where t ≤ T0 and δk−1 = Tk − Tk−1. The swap rate Kt, i.e. the fixed rate K making the
value of the swap at time t equal to zero is given by
Kt =
Bt(T0)−Bt(Tn)∑n
k=1 δk−1Bt(Tk)
. (37)
The value of the swap from initiation onward, i.e. the time-t value, for T0 ≤ t < Tn, of the
swap is given by
P sw(t;T1, Tn) = N
( 1
BTkt−1(Tkt)
−Kδkt−1
)
Bt(Tkt)−Bt(Tn)−K
n∑
k=kt+1
δk−1Bt(Tk)
 ,
(38)
where Tkt is the smallest Tk (strictly) greater than t. If the bank pays the fixed rate in the
swap (case of the so-called payer swap from the bank’s perspective), then the corresponding
clean price P¯t is given by P¯t = −P sw(t;T1, Tn).
Definition 4.4 An interest rate cap (respectively floor) is a financial contract in which
the buyer receives payments at the end of each period in which the interest rate exceeds
(respectively falls below) a mutually agreed strike. The payment that the seller has to make
covers exactly the difference between the strike K and the interest rate at the end of each
period. Every cap (respectively floor) is a series of caplets (respectively floorlets). The
payoff of a caplet with strike K and exercise date T , which is settled in arrears, is given by
P cpl(T ;T,K) = δ (LT (T, T + δ)−K)+.
The time-t price of a caplet with strike K and maturity T is given by, with K¯ = 1 + δK,
P cpl(t;T,K) = δ Bt(T + δ)IE
IPT+δ
[
(LT (T, T + δ)−K)+
∣∣∣ Et]
= Bt(T + δ)IE
IPT+δ
[(
1
BT (T + δ)
− K¯
)+ ∣∣∣ Et]
= K¯Bt(T )IE
IPT
[(
1
K¯
−BT (T + δ)
)+ ∣∣∣ Et]
= K¯IE
[
exp−
∫ T
t rsds
(
1
K¯
−BT (T + δ)
)+ ∣∣∣ Et] . (39)
The next-to-last equality is due to the fact that the payoff
(
1
BT (T+δ)
− K¯
)+
at time T + δ
is equal to the payoff BT (T + δ)
(
1
BT (T+δ)
− K¯
)+
= K¯
(
1
K¯
−BT (T + δ)
)+
at time T . The
last equality is obtained by changing from the forward measure IPT to the spot martingale
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measure IP, cf. [MR05, Definition 9.6.2]. The above equalities say that a caplet can be seen
as a put option on a zero coupon bond.
In the two models considered in the next subsections, the counterparty clean price P
of an interest rate derivative satisfies, as required for (15),
Pt = P (t,Xt) (40)
for all vanilla interest rate derivatives including IR swaps, caps/floors and swaptions.
4.2 Gaussian Vasicek short rate model
In the Vasicek model the evolution of the short rate r is described by the following SDE
drt = a(k − rt)dt+ dW σt ,
where a, k > 0 and W σ is a Brownian motion with volatility σ > 0 on the filtered probability
space (Ω,GT ,F,P). The unique solution to this SDE is given by
rt = r0e
−at + k(1− e−at) +
∫ t
0
e−a(t−u)dW σu .
The zero coupon bond price Bt(T ) in this model can be written as an exponential-affine
function of the current level of the short rate r. One has
Bt(T ) = e
mva(t,T )+nva(t,T )rt , (41)
where
mva(t, T ) = R∞
(
1
a
(
1− e−a(T−t)
)
− T + t
)
− σ
2
4a3
(
1− e−a(T−t)
)2
(42)
with R∞ = k − σ22a2 , and
nva(t, T ) := −eat
∫ T
t
e−audu =
1
a
(
e−a(T−t) − 1
)
. (43)
The clean price P for FRAs and interest rate swaps can be written as
Pt = P (t,rt), t ∈ [0, T ],
inserting the expression (41) for the bond price Bt(T ) into equations (35), (36) and (38)
from Definitions 4.2 and 4.3.
In particular, the time-t price, for T0 ≤ t < Tn, of the interest rate swap is given by
Pt = N
((
e
−(mva(Tkt−1,Tkt )+nva(Tkt−1,Tkt )rTkt−1 ) −Kδkt−1
)
emva(t,Tkt )+nva(t,Tkt )rt
−emva(t,Tn)+nva(t,Tn)rt −K
n∑
k=kt+1
δk−1emva(t,Tk)+nva(t,Tk)rt
)
, (44)
which follows from (38) and (41). In the above equation mva(t, Tk) and nva(t, Tk) are given
by (42) and (43).
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4.2.1 Caplet
To price a caplet at time 0 in the Vasicek model, one uses (39) with
BT (T + δ) = e
mva(T,T+δ)+nva((T,T+δ)rT
for mva(T, T+δ) and nva(T, T+δ) given by (42) and (43). Combining this with Proposition
11.3.1 and the formula on the bottom of page 354 in [MR05] yields (recall K¯ = 1 + δK):
P cpl(0;T,K) = B0(T )Φ(−d−)− K¯B0(T + δ)Φ(−d+), (45)
where Φ is the Gaussian distribution function and
d± =
ln
(
B0(T+δ)
B0(T )
K¯
)
Ξ
√
T
± 1
2
Ξ
√
T
with
Ξ2T :=
σ2
2a3
(
1− e−2aT ) (1− e−aδ)2 . (46)
4.3 Le´vy Hull-White short rate model
In this section we recall a one-dimensional Le´vy Hull-White model obtained within the HJM
framework. Contrary to the Vasicek model, this model fits automatically the initial bond
term structure B0(T ).
As in Example 3.5 of [CGN12], we consider the Le´vy Hull–White extended Vasicek
model for the short rate r given by
drt = α(κ(t)− rt)dt+ dZςt , (47)
where α > 0 and Zς denotes a Le´vy process described below. Furthermore,
κ(t) = f0(t) +
1
α
∂tf0(t) + ψς
(
1
α
(
e−αt − 1))− ψ′ς ( 1α (e−αt − 1)
)
1
α
e−αt, (48)
where f0(t) = −∂t logB0(t) and ψς denotes the cumulant function of Zς ; see [CGN12,
Example 3.5] with the volatility specification σs(T ) = e
−α(T−s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T , therein.
In this paper we shall use an inverse Gaussian (IG) process Zς = (Zςt )t≥0, which is a
pure-jump, infinite activity, subordinator (nonnegative Le´vy process), providing an explicit
control on the sign of the short rates (see [CGN12]). The IG process is obtained from a
standard Brownian motion W by setting
Zςt = inf{s > 0 : Ws + ςs > t},
where ς > 0. Its Le´vy measure is given by
Fς(dx) =
1√
2pix3
e−
ς2x
2 1{x>0} dx.
The distribution of Zςt is IG(
t
ς , t
2). The cumulant function ψς exists for all z ∈ [− ς22 , ς
2
2 ]
(actually for all z ∈ (−∞, ς22 ] since Fς is concentrated on (0,∞)) and is given by
ψς(z) = ς
(
1−
√
1− 2 z
ς2
)
. (49)
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Similarly to the Gaussian Vasicek model, the bond price Bt(T ) in the Le´vy Hull-White
short rate model can be written as an exponential-affine function of the current level of the
short rate r:
Bt(T ) = e
mle(t,T )+nle(t,T )rt , (50)
where
mle(t, T ) := log
(
B0(T )
B0(t)
)
− n(t, T )
[
f0(t) + ψς
(
1
α
(
e−αt − 1))] (51)
−
∫ t
0
[
ψς
(
1
α
(
e−α(T−s) − 1
))
− ψς
(
1
α
(
e−α(t−s) − 1
))]
ds
and
nle(t, T ) := −eαt
∫ T
t
e−αudu =
1
α
(
e−α(T−t) − 1
)
. (52)
In the Le´vy Hull-White model the clean price P for FRAs and interest rate swaps can
be written as
Pt = P (t,rt), t ∈ [0, T ],
by combining the exponential-affine representation (50) of the bond price Bt(T ) and Def-
initions 4.2 and 4.3. In particular, the time-t price, for T0 ≤ t < Tn, of the swap is given
by
Pt = N
((
e
−(mle(Tkt−1,Tkt )+nle(Tkt−1,Tkt )rTkt−1 ) −Kδkt−1
)
emle(t,Tkt )+nle(t,Tkt )rt
−emle(t,Tn)+nle(t,Tn)rt −K
n∑
k=kt+1
δk−1emle(t,Tk)+nle(t,Tk)rt
)
, (53)
which follows from (38) and (50). In the above equations mle(t, Tk) and nle(t, Tk) are given
by (51) and (52).
4.3.1 Caplet
To calculate the price of a caplet at time 0 in the Le´vy Hull-White model, one can replace
B¯∗ with B, Σ¯∗ with Σ, A¯∗ with A, and insert Σ∗ = 0 and A∗ = 0 in Subsection 4.4 of
[CGN12], thus obtaining the time-0 price of the caplet
P cpl(0;T,K) = B0(T + δ)IE
IPT+δ
[(
1
BT (T + δ)
− K¯
)+ ]
= B0(T + δ)IE
IPT+δ
[(
eY − K¯)+ ]
with
Y := log
B0(T )
B0(T + δ)
+
∫ T
0
(As(T + δ)−As(T ))ds+
∫ T
0
(Σs(T + δ)− Σs(T ))dZςs ,
where Σs(t) =
1
α
(
1− e−α(t−s)) and As(t) = ψς(−Σs(t)), for 0 ≤ s ≤ t. The time-0 price of
the caplet is now given by (cf. [CGN12, Proposition 4.5])
P cpl(0;T,K) =
B0(T + δ)
2pi
∫
R
K¯1+iv−RMT+δY (R− iv)
(iv −R)(1 + iv −R) dv, (54)
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for R > 1 such that MT+δY (R) < ∞. The moment generating function MT+δY of Y under
the measure IPT+δ is provided by
MT+δY (z) = exp
(
−
∫ T
0
ψς(−Σs(T + δ))ds
)
(55)
× exp
(
z
(
log
B0(T )
B0(T + δ)
+
∫ T
0
(ψς(−Σs(T + δ))− ψς(−Σs(T ))) ds
))
× exp
(∫ T
0
ψς ((z − 1)Σs(T + δ)− zΣs(T )) ds
)
,
for z ∈ C such that the above expectation is finite. Alternatively, the time-0 price of the
caplet can be computed as the following expectation (cf. formula (39))
P cpl(0;T,K) = K¯IE
[
exp−
∫ T
t rsds
(
1
K¯
−BT (T + δ)
)+]
, (56)
where r is given by (47) and BT (T + δ) by (50).
4.4 Numerics
In Section 5 we shall present TVA computations on an interest rate swap with ten years
maturity, where the bank exchanges the swap rate K against a floating LIBOR at the end
of each year 1 to 10. In order to fairly assess the TVA model risk issue, this will be done
in the Vasicek model and the Le´vy Hull-White model calibrated to the same data, in the
sense that they share a common initial zero-bond term structure B∗0(T ) below, and produce
the same price for the cap with payments at years 1 to 10 struck at K (hence there is the
same level of Black implied volatility in both models at the strike level K). Specifically, we
set r0 = 2% and the following Vasicek parameters:
a = 0.25 , k = 0.05 , σ = 0.004
with related zero-coupon rates and discount factors denoted byR∗0(T ) andB∗0(T ) = exp(−TR∗0(T )).
It follows from (41) and after some simple calculations,
R∗0(T ) = R∞ − (R∞ − r0)
1
aT
(
1− e−aT )+ σ2
4a3T
(
1− e−aT )2
f∗0 (T ) = ∂T
(
TR∗0(T )
)
= k + e−aT (r0 − k)− σ
2
2a2
(
1− e−aT )2
∂T f
∗
0 (T ) = −ae−aT (r0 − k)−
σ2
a
(
1− e−aT ) e−aT .
An application of formula (37) at time 0 yields for the corresponding swap rate the value
K = 3.8859%. We choose a swap notional of N = 310.136066$ so that the fixed leg of the
swap is worth 100$ at inception.
In the Le´vy Hull-White model we use α = a = 0.25 (same speed of mean-reversion
as in the Vasicek model), an initial bond term-structure B0(T ) fitted to B
∗
0(T ) by using
f0(T ) = f
∗
0 (T ) above in (48), and a value of ς = 17.570728 calibrated to the price in the
above Vasicek model of the cap with payments at years 1 to 10 struck at K. The calibration
is done by least square minimization based on the explicit formulas for caps in both models
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reviewed in Subsections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1. After calibration the price of the cap in both models
is 20.161$ (for the above notional N yielding a value of 100$ for the fixed leg of the swap).
The top panels of Figure 1 show 20 paths, expectations and 2.5/97.5-percentiles over
10000 paths, simulated in the two models by an Euler scheme r̂ for the short-rate r on a
uniform time grid with 200 time steps over [0, 10]yrs. Note one does not see the jumps on
the right panel because we used interpolation between the points so that one can identify
better the twenty paths.
Figure 1: 20 paths with 200 time points each of the short rate rt and of the clean price
process Pt = P (t, rt) of the swap. Left: Vasicek model ; Right: LHW Model.
The top panels of Figure 2 show the initial zero-coupon rates term structure R∗0(T ) and
the corresponding forward curves f∗0 (T ), whilst the corresponding discount factors B∗0(T )
can be seen on the lower left panel. This displays an increasing term structure of interest
rates, meaning that the bank will on average be out-of-the-money with a positive Pt = P
sw
t
in (38), or in-the-money with a negative P¯t = −P swt , depending on whether the bank pays
floating (case of a receiver swap) or fixed rate (case of a payer swap) in the swap, see the
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bottom panels of Figure 1. Note that the swap price processes have quite distinct profiles
in the two models even though these are co-calibrated. The bottom right panel of Figure
2 shows the Le´vy Hull-White mean-reversion function κ(t) corresponding to f∗0 (T ) through
(48).
Figure 2: Top Left: R∗0(T ) ; Top Right: f∗0 (T ); Bottom Left: B∗0(T ) ; Bottom Right: κ(t).
5 TVA Computations
In this section we show with practical examples how the CVA, DVA, LVA and RC terms
defined in Section 2 can be computed for various CSA specifications of the coefficient ĝ in
Section 3. The computation are done for an IR swap in the two models of Section 4.
5.1 TVA Equations
The generator X of the Gaussian Vasicek short rate r in the pre-default pricing PDE (16)
is given by
X Θ˜ (t, r) =(a(k − r))∂rΘ˜ + 1
2
σ2∂2r2Θ˜.
Assuming (15), the corresponding TVA Markovian BSDE writes: Θ˜(T, rT ) = 0, and for
t ∈ [0, T ] :
−dΘ˜(t, rt) =ĝ(t, rt, Θ˜(t, rt))dt− ∂rΘ˜(t, rt))dW σt . (57)
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Similarly, the generator X of the Le´vy Hull-White short rate r driven by an IG process
is given by
X Θ˜ (t, r) =(α(κ(t)− r))∂rΘ˜ +
∫
>0
(
Θ˜(t, r + )− Θ˜(t, r)
)
Fς(d), (58)
where Fς stands for the Le´vy measure of Z
ς .4 Assuming (15), the corresponding TVA
Markovian BSDE writes: Θ˜(T, rT ) = 0, and for t ∈ [0, T ] :
−dΘ˜(t, rt) =ĝ(t, rt, Θ˜(t, rt))dt−
∫
>0
(
Θ˜(t, rt− + )− Θ˜(t, rt−)
)
N ς(dt, d),
where N ς stands for the compensated jump measure of Zς .
5.2 BSDE Scheme
Even though finding deterministic solutions of the corresponding PDEs would be possible
in the above univariate setups, in this paper we nevertheless favor BSDE schemes, as they
are more generic – in real-life higher-dimensional applications deterministic schemes cannot
be used anymore. We solve (57) and (58) by backward regression over the time-space grids
generated in Subsection 4.4; see the top panels of Figure 1. We thus approximate Θ˜t(ω) in
(57) and (58) by Θ̂ji on the corresponding time-space grid, where the time-index i runs from
1 to n = 200 and the space-index j runs from 1 to m = 104. Denoting by Θ̂i = (Θ̂
j
i )1≤j≤m
the vector of TVA values on the space grid at time i, we have Θ̂n = 0, and then for every
i = n− 1, · · · , 0 and j = 1, · · · ,m
Θ̂ji = Ê
j
i
(
Θ̂i+1 + ĝi+1
(
t, r̂i+1, Θ̂i+1)
)
h
)
for the time-step h = Tn = 0.02y (one week, roughly). The conditional expectations in space
at every time-step are computed by a q-nearest neighbor average non-parametric regression
estimate (see, e.g., [HTF09]), with q = 5 in our numerical experiments below.
5.3 Numerics
We set the following TVA parameters: γ = 10%, b = b¯ = λ = 1.5%, λ¯ = 4.5%, p =
50%, p = 70% and we consider five possible CSA specifications in this order:
(r, ρ, ρ¯) = (40, 40, 40)%, Q = P, Γ = 0
(r, ρ, ρ¯) = (100, 40, 40)%, Q = P, Γ = 0
(r, ρ, ρ¯) = (100, 100, 40)%, Q = P, Γ = 0
(r, ρ, ρ¯) = (100, 100, 40)%, Q = Π, Γ = 0
(r, ρ, ρ¯) = (100, 40, 40)%, Q = P, Γ = Q = P.
Note that under the first CSA specification, one has λ˜ = 4.5%−0.6×0.5×10% = 1.5% = λ,
so this is a linear TVA special case of Remark 3.1, where the TVA at time 0 can be computed
through a straight Monte Carlo simulation.
Moreover, we shall study the TVA in the two co-calibrated Vasicek and Le´vy models,
and for the receiver and payer swaps. We thus consider twenty cases (5 CSA specifications
× 2 models × receiver versus payer swap).
4The integral converges in (58) under technical conditions stated in [CGN12].
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Table 1 shows the time-0 TVAs and the corresponding CVA/DVA/LVA/RC decom-
positions (four terms on the right-hand side of (18)) in each of the twenty cases. For
benchmarking the numerical BSDE results we display in Figure 3 the time-0 TVA BSDE
value versus the TVA Monte Carlo mid- and 95%-lower and upper bounds in the first CSA
specification (linear). In all four cases the BSDE time-0 value of the TVA is close to the
middle of the confidence interval.
Figure 3: Time-0 linear TVA BSDE value versus Monte Carlo mid-value and 95%-bounds.
From left to right : Receiver swap in the Vasicek model; Receiver swap in the Le´vy model;
Payer swap in the Vasicek model; Payer swap in the Le´vy model.
The numbers of Table 1 are fully consistent with the CVA/DVA/LVA/RC interpreta-
tion of the four terms in the TVA decomposition on the right-hand side of (18), given the
increasing term structure of the data discussed in Subsection 4.4. For instance, a “high”
DVA of 1.75 in the Vasicek model and 2.34 in the Le´vy model for the receiver swap in the
first row of Table 1, is consistent with the fact that with an increasing term structure of
rates, the bank is on average out-of-the-money on the receiver swap with a positive Pt = P
sw
t
(see Figure 1). The CVA, on the contrary, is moderate, as it should be for a receiver swap
in an increasing term structure of interest rates, and higher (“more negative”) in the Le´vy
than in the Vasicek model (-0.90 versus -0.06). The numbers of Table 1 are not negligible
at all in view of the initial value of 100$ of the fixed leg of the swap. In particular, the
LVA terms are quite significant in case of the payer swap with r and/or ρ = 100%, see the
corresponding terms in rows 3 and 4 in the two bottom parts of Table 1. The choice of r
and ρ thus has tangible operational consequences, in regard of the “deal facilitating”(“deal
hindering”) interpretation of the positive (negative) TVA terms as explained at the end
of Subsection 2.4. It is worthwhile noting that all this happens in a simplistic toy model
of TVA, in which credit risk is independent from interest rates. These numbers could be
even much higher (in absolute value) in a model accounting for potential wrong way risk
dependence effects between interest rates and credit risk, see Remark 4.1.
Figures 4 and 5 (receiver swap in the Vasicek and Le´vy model, respectively) and Figures
6 and 7 (payer swap in the Vasicek and Le´vy model, respectively) show the “expected
exposures” of the four right-hand side terms of the “local” TVA decompositions (17) with
ϑ replaced by Θ˜t therein. These exposures are computed as space-averages over 10
4 paths
as a function of time t. Each time-0 integrated term of the TVA in Table 1 corresponds
to the surface under the corresponding curve in Figures 4 to 7 (with mappings between,
respectively: Figure 4 and the upper left corner of Table 1, Figure 5 and the upper right
corner of Table 1, Figure 6 and the lower left corner of Table 1, Figure 7 and the lower right
corner of Table 1).
Finally, Figures 8 (receiver swap) and 9 (payer swap) show the TVA processes in the
same format as the swap clean prices at the bottom of Figure 1.
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Figure 4: Receiver swap in the Vasicek model. Columns: CVA/DVA/LVA/RC, the 4 wings
of the TVA; Rows: 5 CSA Specifications.
22
Figure 5: Receiver swap in the Le´vy model. Columns: CVA/DVA/LVA/RC, the 4 wings of
the TVA; Rows: 5 CSA Specifications.
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Figure 6: Payer swap in the Vasicek model. Columns: CVA/DVA/LVA/RC, the 4 wings of
the TVA; Rows: 5 CSA Specifications.
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Figure 7: Payer swap in the Le´vy model. Columns: CVA/DVA/LVA/RC, the 4 wings of
the TVA; Rows: 5 CSA Specifications.
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Figure 8: Receiver swap: 20 paths with 200 time points each of the TVA process Θ˜t =
Θ˜(t, rt). Left: Vasicek model ; Right: LHW Model. Top to Bottom: 5 CSA Specifications.
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Figure 9: Payer swap: 20 paths with 200 time points each of the TVA process Θ˜t = Θ˜(t, rt).
Left: Vasicek model ; Right: LHW Model. Top to Bottom: 5 CSA Specifications.
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TVA CVA DVA LVA RC
1.47 -0.06 1.75 0.71 -0.92
1.40 -0.06 1.75 0.64 -0.91
0.40 -0.06 0.00 0.76 -0.29
0.66 -0.08 0.00 0.74 0.00
0.43 0.00 0.00 0.72 -0.29
TVA CVA DVA LVA RC
-1.90 -2.45 0.04 -0.68 1.17
-2.64 -2.45 0.04 -1.92 1.67
-2.67 -2.45 0.00 -1.92 1.68
-3.59 -1.77 0.00 -1.83 0.00
-0.50 0.00 0.00 -0.81 0.31
TVA CVA DVA LVA RC
1.34 -0.90 2.34 0.72 -0.85
0.93 -0.90 2.34 0.15 -0.68
-0.45 -0.90 0.00 0.32 0.12
-0.43 -0.76 0.00 0.32 0.00
0.44 0.00 0.00 0.72 -0.29
TVA CVA DVA LVA RC
-2.08 -3.28 0.64 -0.66 1.25
-3.17 -3.28 0.64 -2.41 1.92
-3.59 -3.28 0.00 -2.38 2.11
-4.80 -2.49 0.00 -2.26 0.00
-0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.81 0.31
Table 1: Time-0 TVA and its decomposition. Top: Receiver swap ; Bottom: Payer swap.
Left: Vasicek model; Right : LHW Model.
Conclusion
In this paper, which is a numerical companion to [Cr12a] and [Cr12b], we show on the
standing example of an interest-rate swap how CVA, DVA, LVA and RC, the four “wings”
(or pillars) of the TVA, can be computed for various CSA and model specifications. Positive
terms such as the DVA (resp. negative terms such as the CVA) can be considered as
“deal facilitating” (resp. “deal hindering”) as they increase (resp. decrease) the TVA
and therefore decrease (resp. increase) the price (cost of the hedge) for the bank. Beliefs
regarding the tangibility of a benefit-at-own-default, which depends in reality on the ability
to hedge and therefore monetize this benefit before the actual default, are controlled by the
choice of the “own recovery-rate” parameters ρ and r. Larger ρ and r mean smaller DVA
and LVA and therefore smaller TVA, which in principle means less deals (or a recognition
of a higher cost of the deal). This is illustrated numerically in two alternative short rate
models to emphasize the model-free feature of the numerical TVA computations through
nonlinear regression BSDE schemes. The results show that the TVA model risk is under
reasonable control for both co-calibrated models (models calibrated to the same initial term
structure, but also with the same level of volatility as imposed through calibration to cap
prices). We emphasize however that the latter observation applies to the “standard” case
studied in this paper without dominant wrong-way and gap risks, two important features
which will be dealt with in future work.
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